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THE CHALLENGES OF TOUGH LOVE:
Examining San Francisco's Community Justice
Center and
Evaluating Its Prospects for Success
TODD W. DALOZ*
Introduction
In the space of a few blocks, walking from the local subway
station to San Francisco's City Hall, a tourist or daily commuter is
guaranteed to pass someone panhandling or begging for spare
change, a violation of San Francisco Police Code sec. 120-2.
Extending the walk a bit further, past the home of the California
Supreme Court or the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, you will certainly come across a few souls
who have claimed a stretch of the sidewalk or the entryway of a store
as their home for the night, thus potentially violating San Francisco
Police Code section 22. This walk is also likely to show the signs of
multiple violations of sec. 211 (public consumption of alcohol) or
section 12102 (possessing drugs) or even section 2253 (prostitution).
On top of that, everywhere you look, individuals and businesses are
violating section 33 and section 344 (littering). In many ways, the
* Todd W. Daloz is a 2009 Juris Doctor candidate at the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. He would like to thank Avi Brisman and Professor Hadar Aviram for their
insightful comments, along with the editing staff at Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal for
their tremendous work in preparing this piece for publication. He is ever grateful to his wife,
Susannah Walsh Daloz for her unending brilliance and support.
1. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE, art. 1 § 21 (2008).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210 (West 2008).
3. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE, art. 2 § 225 (2008).
4. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE, art. 1 §§ 33, 34 (2008).
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Tenderloin neighborhood is the heart of crime in San Francisco 5 and
it is certainly the area of this picturesque city most associated with
urban decay and blight.
As with any major city, San Francisco has its share of dirty
neighborhoods, rife with petty crime, homeless people, and litter-
filled streets. But if one were to look a bit further and study the
neighborhood a bit harder, one would see beyond the panhandling,
drug dealing and prostitution, and notice the wealth of community
agencies and outreach programs that are present. That same walk -
from the subway to the seats of power - could reveal volunteer
programs helping the homeless navigate the bureaucratic labyrinth of
social services, day-shelters run by area churches providing hot
meals, or advocacy agencies working to create long-term housing
solutions and increased drug counseling. Regardless of whether
these agencies were drawn to the area because of the pressing need
or whether people have come to the neighborhood to take advantage
of the services, the confluence is by no means happenstance - most
areas afflicted by this type of urban decay are also home to social
service providers.
So where does the disconnect come from? How can
neighborhoods with such a wealth of community involvement
continue to be afflicted with such disorder? What are the techniques
for bringing about positive community change? How can a city
create a system that both deals with pervasive crime and helps
offenders begin to rehabilitate their own lives? What are the pitfalls
to current solutions and how adequately do they address the concerns
of stakeholders? This paper attempts to answer these questions and
suggests that the community court model, pioneered in New York
City and rapidly gaining popularity throughout the country, is an
important step towards renewing neighborhoods and helping
individuals break the cycle of poverty, homelessness and addiction.
5. CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUSTICE CTR. NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT:
TENDERLOIN, SOUTH OF MARKET, CIVIC CENTER, AND UNION SQUARE 13-16 (2008)
[hereinafter TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.sfgov.orgsite/
uploadedfiles/courts/divisions/CollaborativeJustice/SFneedsassessjreport.pdf. The
TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT reviewed crime statistics from 2005 for the Tenderloin and
four surrounding neighborhoods and found that the region accounts for 57 percent of the city's
total drug-related offenses, 30 percent of the property crimes and 26 percent of the violent crimes.
In total, this region - roughly equivalent to one of the eleven supervisory districts in San
Francisco - accounts for one-quarter to one-third of the city's crime. See id. at 16.
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The first section of this paper looks at the rise of so-called
quality-of-life offenses and zero-tolerance policing as a response to
urban decay. These municipal ordinances, which criminalize many
low-level offenses - such as aggressive panhandling or sleeping in
public space - and increased rates of enforcement, have been
credited with "cleaning up" the streets of New York City and
beyond. The use of such policies has grown out of the "broken
windows" theory that signs of social disorder encourage more
serious crime. Yet critics see much of this increased law-
enforcement as a further criminalization of poverty - punishing the
poor and homeless who must undertake life-sustaining activities,
such as sleeping or urinating in public, because society provides
them with no other choice.
One direct result of the expanded enforcement of these quality-
of-life statutes has been a rapid increase of such cases on the dockets
of many urban courtrooms. This has led many courts, more
interested in dealing with violent offenders and other more serious
crimes, to release individuals charged on a quality-of-life violation
with a fine or sentence of "time served." As communities have seen
offenders arrested, only to return to the streets within days, a new
movement has grown up to combine court adjudication with
meaningful sentences that go beyond punitive incarceration to a
model of offender and community restoration. Part two of this note
looks at the rise of community courts as an institution created to deal
with petty offenses in a manner that restores both the community and
the criminal. These courts arose as a response to the waning
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, specifically with regard to
quality-of-life offenses. Focusing on the history and success of the
Midtown Community Court in Manhattan and the Red Hook
Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, this part of the paper
examines the central characteristics of the community court and their
record of success. It concludes with an overview of the
shortcomings inherent in these new systems.
The final part of this paper returns to the Tenderloin to examine
San Francisco's fledgling community justice center and to weigh its
potential for success. Looking at the public response to this new
structure, the assessment of experts and the critiques academics and
activists have offered with regard to other similar institutions, the
conclusion of this paper suggests that the new center is a flawed step
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in the right direction. By linking social services and community
outreach with the force of the criminal justice system, this new
center may well rejuvenate the quality of life on the streets of the
Tenderloin, while giving many of the street residents new
opportunities in life. That said, this new community justice center
faces serious political challenges and has some gaping flaws in its
ability to address community concerns. Likewise, this new system
still relies on the increased criminalization of poverty and fails to
address many of the underlying causes of such crimes.
I. Quality-of-Life Offenses
A. History
As the incidence of crime began to rise across the United States
in the 1970s and '80s, 6 various communities began to implement a
new form of policing specifically focused on so-called "quality-of-
life offenses." 7 These offenses8 can take various forms and tend to
focus on activities that are not necessarily criminal in and of
themselves. Rather, they lend themselves to a general feeling of
community disorder.9 Quality-of-life offenses can include behavior
6. For example, the rates of violent crime rose from 401.0 per 100,000 people in 1972
to 617.7 per 100,000 in 1986. Likewise the rate of property crimes per 100,000 people
rose from 3,560.4 in 1972 to 5,353.3 in 1980. The trends continued to rise until the
mid-1990s. See Bureau of Justice Statistics Database (2008), http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/
dataonline/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (last visited October 18, 2008).
7. New York City is the most famous example of a city-wide focus on such violations. See
William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement of Quality-Of-Life
Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447, 447-50 (1995); See also Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-
Bowers & Kristen E. Brown, Out of Site - Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the
Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 145, 149-50 (1999)
(discussing the rise of policies focused on criminalizing behavior such as begging, sleeping in
public spaces and other quality-of-life violations).
8. While some authorities prefer to call quality-of-life violations "crimes," for the purposes of
this note, I refer to them as "offenses." Though substantively the distinction is slight, "crime"
connotes a level of guilt and violence not generally connected with the category of quality-of-life
violations (e.g., aggressive panhandling, sleeping in public). Such offenses not prohibited because
they are inherently bad (i.e., malum en se), but because various municipalities have proscribed
such activities and they now can carry criminal sanctions.
9. See Maya Nordberg, Jails Not Homes: Quality of Life on the Streets of San Francisco, 13
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 261, 269 (2002). "Disorder" is also a term used to describe this type of
urban decay wherein physical disorder (abandoned buildings, trash-strewn streets) is directly tied
to social disorder (public drinking, catcalling, graffiti) giving an overall feel of a neighborhood
out of control; See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
[Vol. 6
THE CHALLENGES OF TOUGH LOVE
that makes a neighborhood less desirable for its residents to live in:
panhandling, sleeping on sidewalks, loitering near liquor stores,
public urination. Even in some of the most crime-ridden
neighborhoods in the country, people often focus more on these
smaller offenses, rather than on the violent crimes around them
because it is these smaller crimes that residents must confront in
their day-to-day lives. 1°  This general feeling of disorder in a
neighborhood can lead to a greater feeling of insecurity and an
overall sense of danger within a neighborhood, even beyond the
actual incidents of violent crime. I I
Enforcement of quality-of-life offenses began to move into the
law-enforcement mainstream following the publication of George
Kelling and James Wilson's influential essay, "Broken Windows."'
2
Their thesis was strikingly simple and focused directly on the
commission of these quality-of-life offenses. If basic signs of decay
in a neighborhood were left unchecked, their thesis followed, greater
crimes would inevitably occur because the existence of small
criminal activity showed that the community - and the police -
was not interested in keeping the neighborhood completely safe. 1
3
Essentially, "Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large
scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-
breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one
unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so
breaking more windows costs nothing."' 14 The absence of a sense of
community, and a law-enforcement structure that permits small
crimes, gives way to more damaging and violent crime. To cut back
on more violent crimes and make neighborhoods feel safer, the
theory holds, police need to stop even low-level offenders.
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982; WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND
DECLINE CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990).
10. Bratton, supra note 7, at 447-48. For an argument that such concern over quality-of-life
offenses is misplaced and citizens should be more concerned with lethal violence and its effects
on community well-being, see generally, FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1999). For critiques of the broken-windows theory, see infra
note 73.
11. SKOGAN, supra note 9, at 2-3.
12. George Kelling & William Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' Views of the New
York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1218-21 (1998).
13. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 9.
14. Id.
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New York City is the most famous example of this theory
playing out through crime enforcement on the streets. In the early
1990s, William Bratton, as New York transit police chief and
supported by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, decided to focus enforcement
efforts on fare evaders, aggressive panhandlers, homeless substance
abusers, and other minor offenders. 15 His theory, directly based on
the "broken windows" concept, was that these minor criminals
would perpetrate greater crimes if left unchecked. 16  They - and
other potential criminals - would feel emboldened by their ability
to jump the subway turnstiles and thus would begin to harass other
riders; the fare evaders would be the same individuals who would go
on to paint graffiti or mug other passengers.
Accordingly, Bratton stepped up his level of enforcement,
putting more transit police on the platforms and doling out harsher
punishment for the minor offenders. 17  One key facet of his policy
was to make such arrests public - a group of plain-clothes officers
jumping on a fare evader, pinning and cuffing him in the lobby of the
station.' This technique sent the clear message to would-be window
breakers that the police would deal with any form of crime swiftly
and severely. By some measures, this aggressive approach paid off
as the robbery rate on the subway system was nearly cut in half. 19
Bratton was soon selected to be New York City's Police
15. See Bratton, supra note 7, at 449-50 (Giuliani was, in turn, following on strategies
pioneered by former mayors Ed Koch and David Dinkins and some commentators argue that
crime had already started to decline before either one took office in 1993). See Wayne Barrett,
Comment, Giuliani's Legacy: Taking Credit for Things He Didn't Do, GOTHAM GAZETrE,
http://www.gothamgazette.com/commentary/91 .barrett.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
16. See Bratton, supra note 7, at 449-50 ("Chronic fare evaders, violators of transit
regulations, aggressive panhandlers, homeless substance abusers and illegal vendors hawking
goods on station platforms all contributed to an atmosphere of disorder, and even chaos, in the
subways. I was convinced that disorder was a key ingredient in the steeply rising robbery rate, as
criminals of opportunity, including many youthful offenders, looked upon the subway as a place
where they could get away with anything.").
17. Id. at 450.
18. Almost anyone who regularly traveled on the New York Metropolitan Transit lines from
the mid-1990s onward would likely have seen this scenario playing out.
19. See Lawrence Van Gelder, Transit Police Report Decline in a Range of Subway Crimes,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at B3. While the article reports that general crime was down by 47.3
percent, it also notes that the city had received S40 million to fight crime over the same time span.
Some argument can be made that crime additionally decreased because many of the offenders
who were arrested for petty crimes had outstanding warrants or possessed weapons and thus were
brought back into the criminal justice system.
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Commissioner and brought this same strategy to the city as a
whole.
20
By criminalizing small infractions 2 1 through broader municipal
laws and granting police more authority to enforce these minor
violations, quality-of-life offenses are aimed to "clean up" cities,
removing the homeless and other minor offenders and permitting the
community to return to their streets. 22 The challenge of such laws is
that they are often drafted too vaguely 23 or can criminalize an entire
class of defendants based solely on their status. 24  Some statutes
violate specific constitutional principles like free speech or equal
protection. 2 5  To avoid such conflicts, many recent quality-of-life
ordinances are specifically tailored to prohibit certain activity and do
not focus solely on the individual actor.26 While this shift can enable
the police to continue focusing on the same undesired persons,
legally, it protects the statutes from failing in the face of a
constitutional challenge.
20. See Christina Nifong, One Man's Theory Is Cutting Crime in Urban Streets, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 18, 1997, at 1. As part of this over-all strategy, Bratton brought on "Broken
Windows" author George Kelling as one of his advisors. See E.J. Dionne, Editorial, A Broken-
Windows Approach to Crime, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1996, at C7. Of note, Bratton, now police
chief of Los Angeles, has brought Kelling in to consult on his latest crusade, "cleaning-up Skid
Row" in Los Angeles. See Sonya Geis, L.A. Police Initiative Thins Out Skid Row; Crime Is
Down and Businesses Are Hopeful, But Some Complain Policy Harms Homeless, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2007, at A3.
21. "Criminalizing" here means providing criminal sanctions beyond a small fine.
22. See Bratton, supra note 7, at 451-54.
23. See Papachristou, et al. v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 180 (1972) (Florida law
held invalid because it was too vague and thus gave police over-broad authority when enforcing
the law).
24. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (California law found invalid
because it criminalized a class of individuals, not their specific actions and was therefore cruel
and unusual punishment). Based on Robinson, Donald Baker argues that police "sweeps" on
homeless encampments and general "anti-homeless" ordinances (e.g., prohibitions on sleeping in
public parks) are unconstitutional because they deny the homeless any right to shelter and thus
punish them due to their status. See Donald Baker, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation:
Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417 (1991).
25. See NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, COMBATING THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTAND AND PREVENT LEGISLATION
THAT CRIMINALIZE LIFE-SUSTAINING ACTIVITIES 4 (2002), available at http://www.nlchp.org/
content/pubs/Combating%20Criminalization/20Homelessness.pdf ("For example, when a city
creates a prohibition against panhandling but allows firefighters to solicit donations, First
Amendment concerns are raised because the government is permitting one type of oral expression
but not another. The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause may be violated if police
routinely only cite homeless people for sleeping in a public park but allow business people to nap
in the park undisturbed.").
26. Nordberg, supra note 9, at 272.
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Thus, quality-of-life offenses focus mainly on nuisance-type
activities. Every municipal code includes a different list, but often
involve: panhandling, prostitution, loitering, fare-evading on public
transit, small-scale drug dealing, underage drinking, trespassing,
littering, lodging, camping or sleeping in public parks, vandalism,
public drunkenness, public urination, jaywalking.27 The most recent
trend in such ordinances is focuses on activities such as sleeping,
lying on, or blocking the sidewalks or streets. 28  Such laws are
tailored to avoid any constitutional challenges by addressing specific
actions that individuals take and avoiding any status-based
violations.
B. San Francisco's Laws
The quality-of-life offenses enforced on the streets of San
Francisco fall generally into two broad categories. 29  The first
grouping deals with aggressive solicitation and focuses mostly on
individuals begging for money or offering simple services in
exchange for pay. 30 These ordinances grew out of a ballot initiative
in 2003, Proposition M, championed by then-Supervisor Gavin
Newsom, who was running for Mayor on a platform to clean up the
city and address the problem of homelessness. 31  The proposition
was largely a redrafting of the previous anti-panhandling laws, which
had been passed in prior years, but had become difficult to enforce
after various court challenges. 32  Ultimately, Proposition M passed
27. See id. at 269.
28. See Gregory Toomey, Community Courts 101: A Quick Survey Course, 42 IDAHO L.
REV. 383, 399 (2006); CITY OF AUSTIN, SURVEY AND OVERVIEW OF SELECTED QUALITY OF
LIFE ORDINANCES IN 38 METROPOLITAN AREAS (2004) [hereinafter CITY OF AUSTIN SURVEY]
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/news/2004/quality-of life ordinance.htm (follow "WORD" hyperlink
under "Survey and Overview of Selected Quality of Life Ordinances in 38 Metropolitan Areas")
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
29. This division addresses only the strict quality-of-life crimes and not other such minor
crimes as public drunkenness or drug-use. See CITY OF AUSTIN SURVEY, supra note 28, at 39-40.
30. Id. at 38.
31. See Kevin Fagan, S.F. at a Crossroads on Homelessness, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 2003, at
Al.
32. See Rachel Gordon, Burton Vows to Fight Panhandling Measure; If Passed by S.F.
Voters, He'll Go to Court to Block It, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2003, at A19. For a broad overview
of the free-speech violations many of these statutes face, see Charles Mitchell, Aggressive
Panhandling Legislation and Free Speech Claims. Begging for Trouble, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
697 (1994).
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by a large majority, 59 percent to 41 percent of voters, 33 and
Newsom rode this same sentiment into city hall as the new mayor.34
Proposition M is now housed as part of the police code, 35 section
120-2, and prescribes the areas wherein aggressive solicitation is
unlawful.36 Additionally, this ordinance prohibits begging near
automatic teller machines 37 or on buses, 38 or from drivers stopped in
traffic.39  Perhaps the most challenging piece of the statute is its
blanket prohibition on any "soliciting in an aggressive manner in any
public place."4 °  This leaves up to police to determine what
constitutes "aggressive. 4 1  However, before citing or arresting an
individual for violating the law, a police officer must warn them of
their potential infraction and give them an opportunity to comply.
42
The statute itself was created, in part, as a reaction to prior court
decisions invalidating past anti-panhandling laws.4 3 Listed as part of
the "findings" in support of the law is the sentiment that:
The people of San Francisco find that aggressive solicitation
for money in public and private places threatens residents'
and visitors' safety, privacy and quality of life. San
Franciscans seek policies that preserve citizens' right to
enjoy public spaces free from fear and harassment while
protecting the free speech rights of individuals and groups,
permitting appropriate and safe commercial activities of
33. See League of Women Voters, Smart Voter, http://www.smartvoter.org/
2003/I 1/04/ca/sf/measlM/(Iast visited Nov. 17, 2008).
34. For a critique of Newsom's other central campaign initiative regarding homelessness, the
Care Not Cash program, see Teddy Ky-Nam Miller, The Unmet Promises of Care Not Cash, 5
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 171 (2008).
35. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, § 120-2 (2008), available at http://www.municode.com/
Resources/ClientCode-List.asp?cn=San+Francisco&sid=420 1.
36. Id. § 120-2(d).
37. Id. § 120-2(d)(2).
38. Id. § 120-2(d)(4).
39. Id. § 120-2(d)(3).
40. Id. § 120-2(d)(1).
41. The statue does define an "aggressive manner" with five specific illustrations; however,
the final illustration still provides ample room for interpretation: "Following the person being
solicited, with the intent of asking that person for money or other things of value." See id. § 120-
2(c).
42. Id. § 120-2(d)(5).
43. CITY OF AUSTIN SURVEY, supra note 28, at 38.
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street artisans, performers and merchants and providing for
the basic needs of indigent and vulnerable populations.
The law clearly flows from the "broken windows" theory that the
presence of crime is not as important a factor as the presence of a
fear of crime. It also shows an understanding of some of the
constitutional pitfalls that such statutes can encounter. 45 Moreover,
quality-of-life plays a central role in the public rationale behind the
law. 46  Part of its success - i.e., the fact that it has not been
overturned - can likely be chalked up to the specificity used in
outlawing begging in certain areas47 as well as the broad discretion
granted to police in enforcing the law.
Along with defining specific criminal activities, section 120-2
also defines the appropriate remedies for any violations. The most
significant facet of the legislation is that, in lieu of fines4 8 for any
violations (either misdemeanors or civil infractions), an individual
can instead opt to attend a mental health/drug screening. 49 The
findings in support of the law suggest that "aggressive panhandling"
is often the result of individuals suffering from drug addiction or
mental health conditions and thus criminal sanctions may not really
treat the real problem.5° The goal of such a program is to determine
if an individual needs treatment for underlying conditions that have
led to such behavior.51  This diversion is also meant to keep such
52offenders out of the criminal justice courts. In many ways, this
44. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, § 120-2(a) (2008), available at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/ClientCodeList.asp?cn=San+Francisco&sid=420 1.
45. In an assessment of the constitutionality of the statute, one expert suggested that the
language of the statute demonstrates a compelling state interest to restrict begging, while another
thought that certain provisions could be "constitutionally vague." Gordon, supra note 32, at A19.
46. Then-Supervisor Newsom even referred to the need to protect the quality of life in San
Francisco. See id.
47. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, § 120-2(d)(3) (2008), available at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/ClientCode-List.asp?cn=San+Francisco&sid=4201
("soliciting an operator or other occupant of a motor vehicle while such vehicle is located on any
street or highway on-ramp or off-ramp, for the purpose of performing or offering to perform a
service in connection with such vehicle or otherwise soliciting donations or the sale of goods or
services... ").
48. Fines range from $50 to $300 depending on the nature of the infraction and the number of
prior infractions. See id. § 120-2(e).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 120-2(a).
51. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, § 120-2(e).
52. See id. ("The people of San Francisco find that people who aggressively or improperly
solicit because of drug or alcohol dependency or mental illness should be diverted from the
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type of integrated program attempts to link adjudication of quality-
of-life offenses to treatment of drug addiction.
At the time it was introduced, opponents of the measure
contested it as another step in the increased criminalization of
homelessness and contested its constitutionality. 53 Some opponents
specifically contested the ability of social service agencies to act as a
form of diversion for individuals arrested for this new crime,
pointing out that health services did not have the institutional
capacity to deal with criminal offenders. 54 Moreover, no additional
funding was allocated within the body of the proposition 55 and thus
the estimated $3,700 per person cost for screening and public health
would have to be born by the already cash-strapped public
56
agencies.
The second grouping of quality-of-life offenses concerns public
camping and sleeping.57 The Parks Code, section 3.12, prohibits the
construction of any tent or other dwelling in any public park58 and
all parks are closed for sleeping between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and
8:00 a.m. 59 The language of section 3.12 implies that the park as a
whole is not closed to the public, it is only closed to those who wish
to sleep there: "No person shall remain in any park for the purpose
of sleeping between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 8:00 a......"60
Moreover, individuals are only in violation of this ordinance if they
have previously been cited for sleeping in the park and do not accept
available social services, including drug treatment and temporary
criminal court system to a program of screening, assessment and referral operated by the San
Francisco Department of Public Health.").
53. See Vote NO on Proposition M! It Will Misuse Public Funds and Punish Poor People,
STREET SHEET (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://cohsf.org/streetsheet/2003/10/01/vote-no-on-
proposition-m-it-will-misuse-public-funds-and-punish-poor-people/. Opponents also included
Supervisor Angela Alioto, who questioned the proposition's constitutionality in a live debate.
See John Wildermuth, Debate Reignites S.F. Mayor's Race: Returning from Recall, Candidates
Run Up Against City's Finances, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2003, at A l.
54. See id.
55. See League of Women Voters, Smart Voter, http://www.smartvoter.org/
2003/11/04/ca/sf/meas/M/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (summary of proposition).
56. See Vote NO on Proposition M!, supra note 53.
57. See CITY OF AUSTIN SURVEY, supra note 28, at 40.
58. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, § 3.12.
59.Id. § 3.13.
60. The full text of § 3.12 reads: "No person shall remain in any park for the purpose of
sleeping between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., except that special permission may be
granted by the Recreation and Park Department to persons providing security services between
said hours in any park or for other unusual events." (emphasis added).
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shelter. 61 Similar prohibitions exist for the city parks controlled by
the Port Authority.
The San Francisco Police Code additionally limits the use of
automobiles for housing accommodations. 63  It specifically states
that no cars, campers, "house cars" 64 or trailer homes may be used or
occupied "for human habitation." 65  The prohibition against
occupancy extends from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. and is in effect "on
any street, park, beach, square, avenue, alley or public way" or in
any residential neighborhood in the city.66 Such prohibitions further
limit the available options for individuals who are without permanent
housing.
San Francisco also regulates prostitution,67 public drinking68 and
litter,69 much as other cities do. The municipal code does not have a
specific prohibition against sleeping or lying on the sidewalk;
70
however, a general prohibition exists against obstructing the "free
passage of any person" along a street or sidewalk.7'
This array of both offenses and punishments illustrates the city's
desire to address quality-of-life offenses head-on. Criminalizing
homeless solicitation and sleeping in public spaces directly impacts
how the poor live day-to-day and neighborhood residents perceive
their community. What is notable about the San Francisco laws is
that for the most part they do not simply impose a fine or
incarceration on first-time violators. Instead there is a general desire
61. See id. ("A person cited under this section shall not be in violation of this section if: 1) he
or she does not have an outstanding citation for violation of this section; and, 2) within 30 hours
of issuance of the citation, he or she accepts Social Services offered by the city, another public
entity, or a private, non-profit agency. For the purpose of this section, the term "Social Services"
shall mean temporary or permanent housing, residential substance abuse treatment, Homeless
Outreach Team Case Management services, or admission to a hospital or other residential facility
for medical treatment.").
62. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, §§ 2.09, 2.10.
63. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, §§ 96-99.
64. Id. § 96(a). This term is defined as "a motor vehicle originally designed or permanently or
temporarily altered and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has been
permanently or temporarily attached."
65. Id. § 97 (Notably, the use of a motor home for human habitation is not prohibited).
66. Id. § 97.
67. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art 2, §§ 225, 226, 236, 240 (2008).
68. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE, art. 1, § 21 (2008).
69. See id. § 33 et seq. (2008).
70. See CITY OF AUSTIN SURVEY, supra note 28, at 40 (2008).
71. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE, art. 1, § 22 (2008). See also id. §§ 23, 24 (2008). For an
example of an ordinance prohibiting sleeping or lying on a public sidewalk, see L.A. POLICE
CODE, § 41.18 (2007).
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to couple assessment and treatment of the underlying problems with
any other sanction. While this may seem to be a more caring
approach to dealing with quality-of-life violations, some would
argue that any criminalization of life-sustaining activities is a step in
72the wrong direction.
C. Critique of Quality-of-life Statutes
Though the "broken windows" theory is not universally
accepted,73 like San Francisco, many major cities have chosen to
follow this technique as a method of combating rising crime rates.74
In most cases, these cities combine a "zero-tolerance" 75 enforcement
policy with updated quality-of-life ordinances. One central critique
of such law-enforcement schemes is that they ultimately criminalize
poverty and homelessness. 76  As communities decide to enact such
measures and police begin to increase enforcement, more citizens get
caught up in the criminal justices system, often facing harsher
penalties. The most vulnerable group in this scenario is those people
who lack both regular employment and shelter.
The main critiques of these zero-tolerance and quality-of-life
campaigns fall into three categories: the criminalization of poverty,
the disproportionate discretion afforded to police in enforcing the
statutes, and the systemic inadequacy of the criminal justice system
72. For a general overview, see NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 25.
For a specific critique of San Francisco's laws, see Norberg, supra note 9.
73. See, e.g. D.W. Miller, Poking Holes in the Theory of 'Broken Windows, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 9, 2001) (highlighting the lack of empirical evidence linking minor crimes
and "disorder" with an increase in violent crime); Bernard Harcourt, Critique of the Social
Influence of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policy New York
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) (arguing that other social factors- e.g., race, socioeconomic
class - impact the success of broken windows-style policing); Bernard Harcourt & Jens Ludwig,
Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV 271 (2006) (suggesting that current statistics do not support the continued use of a
"zero-tolerance" police policy, nor is such a method the best allocation of scarce law-enforcement
resources); Zimring, supra note 10.
74. Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 73, at 272.
75. See Steve Lee Meyers, 'Squeegees' Rank High on Next Police Commissioner's Priority
List, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at A23 (New York Police Commissioner suggesting full
enforcement of the law against even minor offenders).
76. See, e.g. John J. Ammann, Addressing Quality of Life Crimes in Our Cities:
Criminalization, Community Courts and Community Compassion, 44 ST. Louis L.J. 811 (2000)
(advocating for systemic change, whereby communities will focus on supporting and assisting the
homeless population, rather than criminalizing and harassing); Foscarinis, et al., supra note 7;
Nordberg, supra note 9.
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to properly treat homeless offenders. The first argument stems from
the fact that homelessness is a reality in every American city and is
partially caused by a lack of available resources for individuals and
families without permanent shelter. 7  The lack of homeless shelters
and transitional housing spaces leaves homeless individuals no
choice but to sleep in public areas and risk incarceration or fines.7 s
Adding to the pressures facing such impoverished individuals is the
lack of affordable housing, even for the working poor. 79 A recent
nation-wide study showed that between 17 percent and 37 percent of
low-income individuals were unable to afford the fair-market rent. 80
Moreover, individuals working at minimum wage - even in cities
where the minimum wage is higher than the national standard -
have a difficult time affording housing, and this does not even
consider those people subsisting on Supplemental Security Income
or other state assistance. 8 Accordingly, individuals who have no
choice but to live on the streets find that their daily, life-sustaining
activities can put them in danger of criminal sanctions. For those
whose lives are already walking a razor's edge between building a
better life and falling into complete misery, such penalties can tip the
scale. 82
The second critique of the strategy of strict enforcement is that it
gives police excessively broad latitude in enforcing a statute. In one
telling example, an author points out that law students are free to
solicit passers-by for donations for their homeless advocacy work,
but if homeless people did the same thing on the same street comer,
they would be risking arrest because the city has an anti-panhandling
statute.83 Police would be unlikely to question the motives of well-
dressed students asking for donations, but would quickly stop a less-
well-heeled individual from begging for spare change.
84
77. See Foscarinis, et al., supra note 7, at 149.
78. See generally MARK ROBERT RANK, ONE NATION UNDERPRIVILEGED: WHY AMERICAN
POVERTY AFFECTS US ALL (2005). Chronic homelessness only impacts a small percentage of the
total number of homeless people and most people only experience homelessness for a short
period of time.
79. See id.
80. Foscarinis et al., supra note 7, at 149.
81. See id.
82. In a telling example, one author relays the case of a homeless man who was employed at
a restaurant for seven years, but was jailed for a week when he was arrested for sleeping in a
public space. Foscarinis et al., supra note 7, at 152.
83. Ammann, supra note 76, at 811.
84.1d.
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Empirically, studies have shown that police in cities across the
country enforce more quality-of-life violations against the homeless
than against anyone else. 8 5 These laws are an attempt to remove the
homeless population from certain neighborhoods, yet the court
system suffers the most significant impact when individuals in need
of social services become regular offenders.
The broadest category of critique of strict enforcement of
quality-of-life offenses is that the criminal justice system, as it is
traditionally constituted, cannot adequately cope with these
offenders. In one illustrative study, the author outlines the "cycles of
incarceration" quality-of-life laws bring about. 86  Rather than the
"broken windows" theory leading to a decrease in crime, the author
argues that it simply compounds the number of crimes that homeless
individuals commit. 87  Once a homeless person is arrested and
booked, s/he is given a court date that they can rarely keep because
of her/his transient lifestyle and the state of uncertainty in which s/he
lives. 88 Accordingly, a warrant is issued for her/his arrest and upon
her/his subsequent arrest for a similar quality-of-life crime s/he faces
potential jail time. 89 Thus a "minor municipal citation, initially
punishable by fine or through community service, transforms into a
permanent arrest record and probable jail term.' 90  Increased
criminalization, in short, does not lead to fewer crimes, just more
incarceration.
91
Additionally, as the opponents of San Francisco's Proposition M
pointed out, increased criminalization puts a financial strain on the
criminal justice and social services systems. Some scholars argue
that the increased costs of heightened enforcement are far greater
than the cost of providing improved, preventative services directly to
homeless individuals, and far less effective at treating the underlying
85. See Foscarinis et al., supra note 7, at 151.
86. Nordberg, supra note 9, at 277.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 277-78.
89. Id. at 278
90. Nordberg, supra note 9, at 278.
91. See William Sabol et al. Prisoners in 2006, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN
(2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p06.htm. Both the total number of
prisoners and the rate of inmate population increase have risen steadily since 2000. Perhaps more
tellingly, while the number of federal inmates has decreased, the number of state prisoners -
including those incarcerated for local offenses - has risen.
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causes of poverty and mental illness. 92  Moreover, the police and
court system are not situated to handle the complex addiction and
mental health issues afflicting many homeless people.
93
These critiques suggest that there must be other solutions to the
"broken windows" problem beyond increased police enforcement
and stricter municipal statutes. It seems logical that simply creating
more laws to counteract the disorder in crime-inflicted
neighborhoods will not, alone, solve the complex social, economic
and cultural forces at play. Simply having the local government,
through the police, sweep up all the "bad elements" does not,
without more, cure the root causes of such disorder. While this
process may "clean up" the streets and make local residents feel
safer in the short term, it ultimately does little to address the
underlying causes of these petty crimes. What is required is a more
holistic approach to the problem.
II. Community Courts
The concept of community justice is founded on a belief that
increased community empowerment and participation will improve
the functioning and success of the criminal justice system.94
Community justice scholars and practitioners seek to shift the way
crime and punishment are viewed, moving from a punitive model in
which offenders are punished for their crimes, to one that looks
beyond the specific crime and attempts to both treat the underlying
causes of crime and work to repair the damage the crime has done to
the community. 95  Essential to this view is an understanding that
crime harms not only the victim, but also the surrounding
community. But unlike the traditional criminal law paradigm
wherein prosecutors act for "the People," the community justice
92. See Amnmann, supra note 76, at 820; Nordberg, supra note 9, at 303-04.
93. See Peter Finn & Monique Sullivan, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Police Responses to Special
Populations, at 4 (1987).
94. See, e.g., Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27
CRIME & JUST. 235, 237 (2000); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 359, 362 (2005); Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community
Justice Through Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 897 (2003); Toomey, supra
note 28.
95. See Kurki, supra note 94, at 237-38.
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model incorporates the community directly into different aspects of
the criminal justice system.
This ideal of community involvement can take many different
forms, from community policing, 96 to community prosecution, 97 to
community courts. While all of these initiatives are founded on this
same basic premise of community empowerment and involvement,
community courts are the most dynamic model for drawing the
community into the criminal justice system and reshaping how
offenders and offenses are treated.
Many scholars consider community courts to be a branch of the
family of problem-solving courts. 98  These courts tend to focus on
specific crimes and offer offenders a range of sanctions coupled with
evaluation and treatment. 99 Classic models of problem solving
courts include drug courts, domestic violence courts, family courts,
and behavioral or mental health courts. In any of these settings, an
observer might see a judge working with the defendant and
community members to develop an individualized plan for the
defendant. 100 Offenders are also expected to report back to the court
to give an update on the progress of their treatment.10 1  This
96. "In the classic community policing model, permanent beat officers are frequently visible
and easily accessible in local neighborhoods. The community has some input into the form of
police services it receives, particularly the priority given to different problems. Moreover, instead
of simply reacting to a crime after it occurs, police focus on prevention methods such as teaching
residents how to avoid becoming victims and enlisting them to report suspicious circumstances."
Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control:
Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2000);
see generally Jonathan Simon, Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1415
(2002).
97. Community prosecution refers to collaborative efforts between the local prose-
cutors office and members of the community. This approach "focuses on targeted areas
and involves a long-term, proactive partnerships among the prosecutor's office, law enforce-
ment, the community and public and private organizations, whereby the authority of the
prosecutor's office is used to solve problems, improve public safety and enhance the quality of
life in the community." AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, COMMUNITY
PROSECUTION IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 12 (1995), available at http://www. ndaa.org
/publications/ apri/community-prosecution.html.
98. See, e.g., Fagan & Malkin, supra note 94; Toomey, supra note 28; Greg Berman & Anne
Gulick, Just the (Unwieldy, Hard to Gather But Nonetheless Essential) Facts, Ma 'am: What We
Know and Don't Know About Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1027, 1028 n.10
(2003). Some scholars suggest that the current model of problem-solving courts stems from the
drug court established in Florida by then-State Attorney General Janet Reno. See Helen W.
Gunnarsson, Problem-Solving Courts, 96 ILL. B.J. 184, 185 (2008).
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approach has lead to mixed results, but many communities,
especially communities of color, support this broader approach to
criminal justice. 102
A. History
By the mid-1990s the criminal justice system in the United States
was nearing a crisis. Jails were overflowing, court dockets were
bloated and judges were overloaded. 103 Part of the central problem
facing courts was what scholars have called "a broken system, a
system that relie[d] on increasing levels of coercion without a
corresponding reduction in crime.' 10 4  Essentially the concept that
incarceration would deter future crime was called into question. As
more offenders were released or given light sentences because the
system could not hold them, the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system came under fire. 105 If part of the system's goal was to deter
future offenders by punishing current ones, light punishments served
to delegitimize the courts and weaken the power of the culture of
coercion because they did little to deter offenders. Such a "broken
system" could not be repaired through simple court reform,0 6 but
instead required a major shift in the way that punishment was meted
out.
Part of the increased pressure on the courts at this time was due
to the increased number of individuals arrested for quality-of-life
offenses. 107 As business interests and community developers pushed
for stricter enforcement of these statutes to improve their
neighborhoods and property values, more individuals were swept
into the court system and off the street. 08 But this spike in arrests
merely swamped courts and left many offenders unpunished and free
102. See Berman & Gulick, supra note 98, at 1048.
103. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 94, at 903; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
104. Fagan & Malkin, supra note 94, at 903; see also JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER
MACHINE (2000).
105. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 94, at 901-02.
106. See id. at 903.
107. See Judith Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 125, 131 (2004); Fagan & Malkin, supra note 94, at 903; Lanni, supra note 94, at
366-67.
108. See Kaye, supra note 107, at 131; Ammann, supra note 76, at 816-17.
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to return to the community, often with sentences of "time served."' 10 9
As a response to more individuals going through the revolving door
of criminal justice, more community members pushed to become
involved in the adjudication process with the aim of improving its
success and increasing its legitimacy. 110  Eventually, advocates
within the criminal justice system and in local communities
developed a plan for how to both deal with the vast number of
quality-of-life violations and improve the vibrancy of the local
community, based in part on the success of other problem-solving
courts.
The resulting structure has become a combination of a traditional
court setting - an arraignment before a judge - coupled with an
array of community services."' Additionally, community
involvement has meant a more complete rehabilitation, not just for
the offender, but for the impacted community as well. Thus, a
sentence might involve drug counseling and some form of
community service wherein the offender attempts to "fix" what they
have done. This can mean scrubbing graffiti, cleaning subway
stations, or planting trees. 112 By placing the offenders back in the
community, publicly improving the neighborhood and making up for
their crimes, community courts attempt to create a culture of social
support for an "orderly" community.
B. Midtown Community Court
The nation's first official community court opened its doors in
midtown Manhattan in October of 1993.113 At its inception, the
Midtown Community Court was meant to be a three-year
demonstration project to show how effective the community court
model could be. 114 Located in midtown Manhattan, a few blocks
from Times Square, the court has a specific jurisdiction comprised of
109. See Kaye, supra note 107, at 131.
110. See Lanni, supra note 94, at 366.
111. See id. at 374.
112. See Kaye, supra note 107, at 133.
113. See Kaye, supra note 107, at 132; For an excellent overview of the history and successes
of the Midtown Community Court, see RICHARD CURTIS, ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE
LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (1997),
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfmfuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID =
591 &currentTopTier2--true.
114. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 113, at 1.
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350 square blocks, including several neighborhoods and three police
precincts - it additionally has city-wide jurisdiction over
prostitution cases. 15 Prior to the establishment of the court, the area
accounted for 43 percent of Manhattan's misdemeanor arrests."16 It
was known for the high level of petty crime and general social
disorder - highlighted by the armies of "squeegee men" who
ripped-off motorists by charging them for cleaning car windows that
the squeegee men had dirtied. Cleaning up Times Square and the
surrounding neighborhoods became the goal of several New York
City mayors 18 and the introduction of the "broken windows" theory
of policing ensured that the local court dockets would swell. 1 9
The Midtown Community Court resulted from a collaboration
between several different judicial and non-judicial agencies, all
focused on the problem of a slow and unresponsive judicial
system. These agencies intentionally brought community
members into the planning process' 2 1 under the theory that to truly
change the enforcement culture, there needed to be broad community
buy-in to the project at hand. 122 By involving community members,
the Midtown Community Court project sought to increase the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the local
community. 123
The new court focused on dealing more rapidly with minor, non-
violent offenses and providing some form of assessment or treatment
for the offenders. From its founding the court has attempted to
accomplish five goals - goals central to most community courts:1 24
"to provide speedier justice; to make justice visible in the community
where crimes take place; to encourage enforcement of low-level




118. The most notable efforts were by Mayors David Dinkins and Rudolph Guiliani. See id.
119. See Kaye, supra note 107, at 131-32.
120. This coordinating body included planning staff from the New York State Unified Court
System, the City of New York and the Fund for the City of New York (a private non-profit
organization). See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 113, at 1.
121. See id. at 2.
122. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 94, at 908-09.
123. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 113, at 2.
124. See JOHN FEINBLATT & GREG BERMAN, RESPONDING TO THE COMMUNITY:
PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING AND CREATING A COMMUNITY COURT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
BULLETIN 2 (2001), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ bja/185986.pdf.
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crime; to marshal the energy of local residents, organizations and
businesses to collaborate on developing community service and
social service projects ... and to demonstrate that communities are
victimized by quality-of-life offenses." 
125
To fulfill these goals, the court has focused only on dealing with
quality-of-life violations and minor property crimes and has created
an intake system focused on rapid adjudication and individualized
sentencing. 126 Accordingly, offenders are brought in soon after they
are arrested and most cases are dealt with on the first appearance.
2 7
Most importantly, the presiding judge attempts to "combine
punishment and help" when determining a sentence.12 8  Most
sentences result in either quality-of-life classes, wherein offenders
learn about other quality-of-life offenses and why they are illegal, or
community service projects in the neighborhood where they
committed the crime. 129  This community-service form of
punishment serves to rehabilitate both the offender and the
community where the crimes took place.
The court also has a community advisory committee consisting
of members from the local community, nearby attorneys, and
administrators of local service providers. 130  This group acts as a
liaison between the local community, various stakeholders and the
court's administrators.' 31  As part of their role in the court, the
advisory committee reports on conditions in the local neighborhood
and suggests new projects. 132  The group also follows up on the
progress of past-offenders who have undergone a course of
treatment. 133
Since its inception, the court has had a marked level of success.
The processing time between an offender's arrest and arraignment is
nearly forty percent faster than in a standard criminal court. 134
Roughly seventy five percent of offenders serve sentences that
125. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 113, at 1.
126. See Anthony Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10
WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 63, 85 (2002).
127. See Kaye, supra note 107, at 133.
128. See id.
129. See id.




134. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 113, at 4.
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involve some form of community service. 135  In the first eighteen
months the court was in operation, these projects provided $280,000
in labor to the local community.'1 36 Additionally, the court worked to
perform outreach with local community groups and non-profit
agencies, along with providing tours of the facility for interested
individuals. 137
Increasing the efficacy of enforcement of low-level crimes was a
central goal for the Midtown Community Court project. By
providing swifter adjudication of arrests and developing meaningful
and visible sentences for offenders, planners hoped to show that the
criminal justice system was addressing quality-of-life offenses and
attempting to treat some of their underlying causes. The court deals
with approximately 17,000 cases a year; roughly 65 each day.
1 38
Many of these cases result in sentences that combine an element of
community service with some required treatment or job training. 139
Perhaps most importantly, the court has had a substantial impact
on crime and the quality of life in the local community. The court
has a compliance rate of 75 percent, meaning that three-quarters of
the convicted offenders carry out their sentences of community
service or other projects. 140  This number ranks as the highest
compliance rate in the city, 141 far better than the 50 percent
compliance rate reported by the main criminal court in downtown
Manhattan.142  Additionally, actual crime rates in the court's
jurisdiction have declined as greater enforcement and community
involvement have increased since the court's inception. Specifically,
prostitution arrests dropped 56 percent in the first 18 months the
court was open and illegal vending was down twenty four percent
during the same period.143 Interestingly, the court also had a much
135. See Kurki, supra note 94, at 259.
136. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 113, at 4.
137. See id.
138. See Knight, supra note 115, at Al.
139. See Berman & Gulick, supra note 98, at 1038.
140. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF, ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPACTS, COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION 4
(2005), available at www.courtinnovation.org /uploads/ documents/ dispensing%20justice%20
locally%2011%202005.pdf; see also Berman & Gulick, supra note 98, at 1038.
141. See CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT, RESULTS,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index. c fi? fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&Pagel D=591 &currentTo
pTier2--true (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
142. See SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 140, at 4.
143. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 113, at 7.
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lower rate of incarceration than its downtown counterpart. 144
Moreover, the recidivism rate for most crimes has shown a decrease
since the court began operation; a marked contrast to the increase
found at the downtown court. 1
45
Finally, the community inclusion aim of the court has been
largely successful. Community members feel that their initial
concerns about quality-of-life offenses in the neighborhood have
been put to rest. 1 6 The court's success has also disproved the early
skepticism about the success of community service as a form of
punishment. 147 While other problems have taken the place of these
early worries, the court's local community recognizes the benefits
the new program has brought. 1
48
C. Current State
The success of the Midtown Community Court has led to
replication of the model in communities around the country and
around the world. 149 While each of these courts serves a different
community and offers a different array of social services, many of
the same features can be found in each court. In general, such courts
share several major objectives:
[T]hey aim to sanction offenders; improve local community
quality of life by reducing low-level crime; provide some
pay-back to local communities for some of the quality of life
crime these communities have been subjected to; and aid
offenders in overcoming personal problems that contributed
to their wrongful behavior and in many instances may result
144. See id. at 6.
145. See SVIRIDOFF ET AL, supra note 140, at 6-8. For example, the recidivism rate for
prostitution dropped 10 percent at the Midtown Community Court, but was up 18 percent at the
downtown court.
146. See id. at 5.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. According to the Center for Court Innovation, there are community court projects in 30
different communities in the United States and at least nine projects in other countries around the
world. See CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT, RESULTS,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pagelD=570&documentT
opiclD=17 (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
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in more serious future criminal activity by these offenders if
what causes these problems is not corrected. 1
50
The courts also tend to respond to the needs of the local
community by placing a premium on their location. Most
community courts are located in the communities that they serve.
Unlike the majority of courts in the criminal justice system, these
courts eschew centralized bureaucracy in favor of remaining
localized. This local connection enables the court to determine the
types of problems afflicting the community and to stay active in the
lives of community members. 151 Because the court oversees the local
jurisdiction, police officers can arrest, arraign, and process offenders
more quickly than in systems where there is only one central
administrative hub. 1
52
The challenge of this inherently localized nature of community
courts is that, beyond the general principles outlined above, it is very
difficult to generalize about such courts.' 53  Indeed, the specific
solution to a local area's problems must differ from one community
to the next. Moreover, establishing clear criteria for success is next
to impossible when the benefits a community may receive from a
new court "range from the concrete (less graffiti) to the intangible
(how safe people feel, and how people relate to each other and their
physical space)."' 154  Accordingly, rather than a cookie-cutter
approach copying the exact model of the Midtown Community
Court, newer community court projects follow the general
philosophy of engaging the local community and working on holistic
models of justice.
The community courts movement continues to gain momentum
as urban centers have experienced an influx of business and
development interests. More groups are becoming interested in
"cleaning-up" once forgotten neighborhoods to increase their
development potential and this leads to a desire to address the
incumbent disorder of such areas. Community courts provide a
150. Quintin Johnstone, The Hartford Community Court: An Experiment That Has
Succeeded, 34 CONN. L. REV. 123, 124 (2001).
151. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 94, at 908.
152. See Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability: Consensus
and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573 (2003).
153. See Berman & Gulick, supra note 98, at 1037.
154. See Berman & Gulick, supra note 98, at 1037
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ready strategy for neighborhoods looking to increase their local
safety and improve their quality of life.
D. Red Hook Community Justice Center
One of the leading examples of an integrated community court is
the Red Hook Community Justice Center ("RHCJC") in Brooklyn,
New York. 155 Started in 2000 in a low-income neighborhood, home
to one of the oldest public housing developments in the country,'
56
the RHCJC was the product of a coordinated effort of both national
and local agencies, including the Department of Justice and the local
District Attorney's office. 157 Like other community courts, a central
part of the planning process for the RHCJC was to gain buy-in from
the local community and collect their input for its development.
158
Following the wishes of the community and the model of other
community courts, the RHCJC has focused on swift adjudication of
criminal offenses and returning offenders into the local
neighborhood to carry out restorative sentences.159 It also offers
treatment programs for offenders who may be suffering drug
addiction or mental health conditions and houses a job-training
center. 160 While these facets are common in many community
courts, the RHCJC differs from traditional community courts, like
the Midtown Community Court, in two key ways.
First, the RHCJC is a multi-jurisdictional court that adjudicates
drug crimes, domestic violence, minor criminal offenses (including
some felonies) and landlord-tenant disputes.' 6 1  Ordinarily, these
cases would be heard in three different courts (Criminal, Family, and
Civil), but because the focus of this court is on swift adjudication of
the problems facing the local community, one judge handles all such
155. For a good general overview of the RHCJC since its founding, see Greg Berman &
Aubrey Fox, From the Benches to the Trenches: Justice in Red Hook, 26 THE JUST SYS.
JOURNAL 77 (2005), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DComm/Projects/JSJindex/
CumTopical/AltemativeCts.html.
156. See id.
157. RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER, http://www.courtinnovation.org/
index.cfmfuseaction=Page.view Page&pagelD=572 (last visited March 2, 2008).
158. See Berman & Fox, supra note 155, at 78.
159. See Berman & Fox, supra note 155, at 78.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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matters. 162 As with other community courts, the practice of bringing
many matters before the same judge allows that judge to hear the full
range of problems facing the community and to tailor the
punishments to restore the damage done to the neighborhood, as well
as work on rehabilitating the offender. Through the coercive power
of the court and a strict system of accountability, offenders work off
their sentences through community service projects, in GED classes,
job trainings, and drug counseling.' 63
The second unique characteristic of the RHCJC is that it is
actively focused on crime prevention. 64 Beyond adjudicating cases
and working closely with neighborhood stakeholders to restore the
community, the RHCJC is a focal point for community activity.
Specifically, the RHCJC houses a community volunteer project and
offers mediation programs to area residents.' 65  Moreover, the
RHCJC actively engages in outreach programs designed to employ
area youth and involve the community in the ongoing work of
"doing justice." These programs include a Public Safety Corps of 50
young people who work to complete 1700 hours of local community
service, a youth court where area young people help adjudicate one
another's crimes, and an open-door policy permitting any
community member to use the RHCJC's services. 
166
The RHCJC has been largely successful in its efforts to engage
the community and cut down on local crime. After the first year of
full operation, the neighborhood approval rating for the general
criminal justice system was triple what it had been before the center
had opened. 167 Not surprising, the area residents who had used the
RHCJC had the most positive impressions of the criminal justice
system. 168  Moreover, individuals who had used the center were
"more likely to know their neighbors and less likely to report being
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. One could argue that the Manhattan Community Court is likewise focused on prevention
through job training programs and GED classes, but the breadth of the RHCJC offerings
specifically those focusing on youth - evidence a deeper commitment to prevention.
165. See Berman & Fox, supra note 155, at 78.
166. See Berman & Fox, supra note 155, at 83.
167. For example, one study shows that in 1997 the court system had a community
approval rating of 12 percent, whereas in 2001 the rating was 38 percent. See KELLI
MOORE, Op. DATA 2001: RED HOOK, BROOKLYN: COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT, PERCEPTIONS OF
QUALITY OF LIFE, SAFETY AND SERVICES 3-4 (2004), available at www.communityjustice.org/_
uploads/documents/rhopdata.pdf.
168. See id. at 3.
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victimized or feeling worried about being robbed, assaulted or being
a victim of a home break-in."' 169 Interestingly, however, residents of
Red Hook did not feel like their quality of life had increased since
the RHCJC had opened.1
7 0
That said, as a whole, residents felt significantly safer in public
areas of the neighborhood than they had prior to the RHCJC
opening. 171 Rates of crime have also dropped in Red Hook since the
RHCJC opened. In the past eight years the Red Hook neighborhood
has had two years without recording a homicide, something that had
not happened once in the prior 30 years.' 72 Overall, the rate of crime
has dropped 16 percent, including a major drop in burglary and other
property crimes. 
173
E. Critique of Community Courts
Even with the success of such programs as the Midtown
Community Court or the RHCJC, the community court movement is
not without its detractors, some of whom are also ardent
supporters. 174  Critiques of community courts can generally be
placed into three categories: problems arising from a move away
from traditional court norms, concerns about the community served
by the court, and problems that the community courts either fail to
reach or continue to exacerbate. All of these critiques highlight
challenges faced by this imperfect solution to such a pervasive and
multi-faceted problem.
One central concern of community court critics is the way in
which such courts depart from some of the standard hall marks of a
traditional court, namely: the rule of law, the role of the judge, and
the role of defense counsel. Many of these problems stem directly
from the popular inspiration for the court - its focus on community
169. See id. at 4.
170. See id. at 5.
171. See id. at 6-7.
172. See Charles J. Hynes, Commentary, Community Courts Effective Says Brooklyn District
Attorney, S.F. SENTINEL (Aug. 23, 2007), available at http://www. sanfrancisco
sentinel.com/?p=4330.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving Courts, 21 NAT'L BLACK
L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (Wolf works for the Center for Court Innovation, the leading think-tank
on community courts, and has written numerous papers on community and problem-solving
courts); Malkin, supra note 152 (Malkin spent 15 months studying the RHCJC).
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needs. Because the courts are meant to react to popular conceptions
of justice and community needs, they act as "experimentalist
institutions" making their way with each new defendant. 175  As
courts mature over time, they will naturally gain more precedent
upon which to base future treatment plans, but as long as the focus of
any sentencing is on the individual and their needs, there is a
tremendous degree of discretion left to the judge.
Discretion is also a concern when looking at the overall scope of
the court. Community courts are often given general jurisdiction
over a broad geographic area and are not constrained by subject-
oriented jurisdiction. 176 Additionally, as many courts focus their
work on quality-of-life offenses, they tend to work with vague
statutes and flexible sentencing structures which "may vest excessive
discretionary power in the hands of courts .... 177 Likewise,
because communities are focused on providing relief for crime and
poverty-ridden neighborhoods, they often give community courts a
broad mandate to enforce crimes that otherwise would lie outside the
scope of a similarly situated criminal court.
17 8
The community-centered approach to a court system also
changes the public role of the community court's presiding judge.
Because such judges must both adjudicate issues before them and
address the broader needs of the local community, they necessarily
take on a larger role outside the courtroom. 179 Community court
judges are well-known outside of their courtrooms and must both
adjudicate the crimes of community members and sit with them in
public meetings. 180  This public role gives the judges a degree of
local political power and they can accordingly be pulled into political
disputes or even campaigns. 18 1 Such a mixing of law and politics
raises broad concerns about the independent nature of the judge and
the court as a whole. This problem strikes at the heart of the
community/court balance, between creating a system that is
legitimate in the eyes of the local community and one that is fair and
just in the eyes of the accused.
175. See Malkin, supra note 152, at 1575-76.
176. See RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 157.
177. See Malkin, supra note 152, at 1575.
178. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 82.




The structure and goals of community courts also raise problems
for criminal defendants. Much of the focus of such courts is on
rehabilitating the offender and the community and not on punishing
an individual for a crime. This shift in punitive focus raises a
challenge for both offenders and defense lawyers whose main goal is
to keep their clients out of jail. 182 Access to social services programs
in community courts is often predicated on a defendant's guilty
plea. 183  Such a system incentivizes a guilty plea in exchange for
treatment and does not present individuals with the chance to both
prove their innocence and receive needed services.
Likewise, the mixed sentencing of community courts creates
difficulties for defense lawyers. When faced with the opportunity to
keep their clients out of jail and get them much needed treatment,
defense lawyers may not aggressively pursue their role as zealous
advocates.' 84  In fact, in some community courts, the defense
counsel works directly with the prosecution to develop an ideal
strategy for the defendant. 185 Additionally, the focus on speeding up
the time between arrest and sentencing (often limiting it to one or
two days 186) can limit the efficacy of counsel, regardless of a given
lawyer's view of the client's needs.' 87  The end result of such a
system is to limit the virtues of the adversarial process and turn an
offender's ally into a social worker, assessing the treatment needs
and not the legal needs of their client.
The second major category of critiques of community courts
relates to the nature of the community that such courts ultimately
serve. On central concern is that often the main supporters, and
sometimes funders, of community court programs are members of
the business community. 188  With economic interests driving the
founding of the court, lower-income residents generally lose the
182. See Tamar Meekins, Specialized Justice: The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and
the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006); Malkin,
supra note 152, at 1580-81.
183. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 87.
184. See Meekins, supra note 182, at 7.
185. See Malkin, supra note 152, at 1579.
186. See Ammann, supra note 76, at 818.
187. See id.
188. One of the central sponsors of the Midtown Community Court was the Times Square
Business Community. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 89.
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power to influence the direction and scope of the court. 189  More
importantly, if business gets too broad a stake in the community
court, it can lead to serious constitutional concerns. In one case in
Missouri, a state circuit court struck down the St. Louis community
courts because they were directly funded by a local business
partnership. 190  This unique relationship meant that the court acted,
in effect, like a private court and there was "the personal and
financial incentive inherent in the system" for the court to rule in the
interest of the funding business organization. 191 Understandably,
community courts must both seek out ways to fill budgetary short-
falls, while still avoiding the appearance that their main goal is to
make the neighborhood more attractive to incoming economic
development, rather than serving the needs of the community
population. 1
92
Far less obvious and potentially more pervasive is the question of
which community provides input and advice to the court. Some
studies suggest that even in neighborhoods with successful
community courts, racial minorities have less trust in the court
institution. 193 This may be due in part to the fact that the make-up of
community advisory panels can often become more representative of
the middle class and white elements of a given neighborhood, rather
than the demographics of the community as a whole. 194 In a worst-
case scenario, the monopolization of a community court process can
lead to those with power in a community driving out those who lack
any political capital.
The final critique of community courts is that they do not
adequately address some of the central problems they were created to
solve. The impetus behind the community court movement was, in
part, to increase the legitimacy of the criminal court system by
189. For examples of the close relationship between business interests and the founding of
two community courts, see id. at 89-90.
190. State of Missouri, ex rel. Bogan v. Bonner, No. 044-250, Mo. Cir. Ct., 22nd Jud. Cir.,
Div. 5 (Sept. 24, 2004).
191. Id. at 10.
192. See Toomey, supra note 28, at 410-11.
193. See Moore, supra note 167, at 8, 11; cf Berman & Gulick, supra note 98, at 1048 (citing
a study that showed strong support for problem-solving courts, particularly among African
American and Latino respondents); Wolf, supra note 174 (manuscript at 12-13, on file with
author).
194. See Kurki, supra note 94, at 288-90; see also Wolf, supra note 174 (manuscript at 13-
14, on file with author) (citing studies showing racial minority distrust of the increased number of
charged quality-of-life offenses).
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bringing in the views of the local community. Yet even when courts
have a rigorous system for hearing community concerns, there is no
set structure for them to necessarily respond to these concerns. 195
Indeed, at the RHCJC, the court has created a multi-tiered process to
gather community input through both formal engagement and
informal interactions. 196 But there is no formal process for acting
upon the interests or concerns of the community.1 97 Community
members can speak and both sides may agree on the problems facing
their community, but the RHCJC shifts policy only as it sees fit.
Given some of the concerns about the groups attending such
advisory meetings and the need for consistent application of the law,
there is no true democratic voice for the community. Perhaps this
lack of direct community power acts as an acceptable filter.
An additional concern is the increased burden these courts place
on the poorest members of society. As community courts speed up
the prosecution of quality-of-life offenses, more homeless
individuals and racial minorities are brought into the criminal justice
system. 198 This process continues to treat the victims of poverty as
the "authors of decline" and not the symptoms of a much larger
societal problem. 199 Moreover, the increased criminalization does
not necessarily provide these individuals with services that will help
them turn their lives around. In some instances, the coercive nature
of the courts - even when used to provide needed treatment - can
result in the displacement of homeless and other populations outside
the physical jurisdiction of the community court. 0 Rather than
solving the root problems of crime, community courts can provide a
mechanism that simply moves the unwanted behavior into another
neighborhood.
195. See Malkin, supra note 152, at 1583.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Ammann, supra note 76, at 817.
199. Kurki, supra note 94, at 289; see Ammann, supra note 76, at 819.
200. See Toomey, supra note 28, at 408.
Winter 20091 THE CHALLENGES OF TOUGH LOVE
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
III. The San Francisco Plan
A. Origins
In March of 2007, Mayor Gavin Newsom announced that he was
201planning to start a community court system in San Francisco.
Following a visit to the Midtown Community Court in Manhattan,
the Mayor stated that he wanted to "bring[] it to San Francisco. 2 °2
Much like his initial campaign for mayor, focused on Proposition M
and the "Care Not Cash" program, 20 3 the Mayor made the creation of
a community court system in San Francisco a central part of his re-
election bid.20 4 Specifically, the Mayor cited the frustration law
enforcement officials felt when attempting to enforce existing
quality-of-life violations in a system that only enabled them to issue
a citation requiring the offender to appear in Traffic Court in 45
205days. Such a procedure permitted offenders to return to the streets
and continue their behavior immediately after receiving the
206
citation. Newsom specifically targeted an area encompassing
much of the Tenderloin and South of Market ("SOMA")
neighborhoods for this proposed court, as this was the region with
the greatest concentration of quality-of-life offenses.20 7
Additionally, the community perception of the quality of life in these
neighborhoods was low. A recent survey had found that 49 percent
of residents in the Tenderloin felt "very unsafe" or "unsafe" walking
at night in their neighborhood 20 8 and close to half felt that the
cleanliness of the streets and sidewalks in their neighborhood were
"poor" or "failing."' 20 9
201. See Heather Knight, S.F. Plan to Tackle Nuisance Crimes: Newsom Wants to Create a
Court for Quality-of-Life Cases Like Panhandling and Prostitution, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 17, 2007,
at Al.
202 Id.
203. Both programs championed by Newsom gained popular political support, but have yet to
receive adequate funding from the City or the Board of Supervisors. See supra notes 31-35
("Care Not Cash"); infra notes 267-68 (Tenderloin Community Justice Center).
204. See Knight, supra note 201, at Al.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Knight, supra note 115, at Al.
208. See CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CITY SURVEY 2007, app. A-3,
http://co.sfgov.org/webreports/details.aspx?id=602.
209. See id. at app. A-9, 10.
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The actual process of developing the new Community Justice
Center ("CJC") had begun with the formation of a steering
committee in January of 2007, made up of representatives from the
Superior Court, Mayor's Office, Sheriff's Department, Police
Department, Department of Public Health, Human Services Agency,
Pretrial Diversion, Adult Probation, District Attorney's Office,
Public Defender, City Attorney, and others. 2 1  Over the following
months, the Mayor's office sought to bring various community
groups into the planning process. 21 ' That summer, a group of
stakeholders, including individuals from the San Francisco Chamber
of Commerce, the Tenderloin Community Benefits District, and
other Tenderloin community members, traveled to Red Hook to visit
212the RHCJC. A representative from the Midtown Community
Court also visited San Francisco to explain to members of the city's
criminal justice system how that court structure worked.213
Additionally, the city employed the Center for Court Innovation, the
leading think tank on community courts, to perform a needs
assessment study on the area the proposed Community Justice
214Center would serve.
Both the city and the Center for Court Innovation focused on
creating community support for the CJC. The Center for Court
Innovation held numerous meetings with local community groups,
specifically grass-roots organizations like Larkin Street Youth, area
businesses like the Warfield Theater, and local community-service
agencies like Tom Waddell Health Center. 215  These meetings
focused on issues facing the community at large and probed how the
community might react to the proposed CJC. 216 In all, organizers
contacted more than 80 organizations 217 and more than 200
individuals, representing still more groups and agencies, attended
open community meetings about the CJC.218  Beyond involving
210. See TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 3.
211. See Interview with Elaine Zamora, Member, Tenderloin Community Justice Center
Advisory Committee (Feb. 28, 2008).
212. See MOVING JUSTICE FORWARD, Blog, http://sfcollaborativejustice.blogspot
.com/2008/0 1/san-francisco-visits-red-hook.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
213. See Knight, supra note 115, at Al.
214. See TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 3.
215. See TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at app. F.
216. See id. at app. D.
217. See id. at app. F.
218. See Interview with Elaine Zamora, supra note 211.
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various community groups in the initial planning stages, the Mayor's
office sought out and obtained the vital support of the judges of the
San Francisco Superior Court. 2 19  This endorsement provided the
Mayor's office with greater institutional capacity and a firmer basis
for creating a functional court system.
All members of the local community however were not satisfied
with the process. The city Public Defender expressed skepticism
about the CJC's ability to provide due process safeguards to
offenders in the face of a push for greater efficiency. 220 Local
community groups, homeless advocates, and members of the County
Board of Supervisors 221 reacted strongly to the initial proposal,
labeling it a "Poverty Court." 222 The San Francisco director for the
Coalition on Homelessness saw the CJC as another method for
criminalizing homelessness: "There is absolutely no reason that
somebody should be put into the criminal justice system when they
have committed no crime except to be too poor to afford a place to
live." 223  The supervisor for the district over which the CJC would
have jurisdiction led a protest with community members to the steps
of City Hall, decrying the Mayor's focus on the criminal justice
system as a solution for poverty issues.224
Some of the most pointed concern came from the members of the
city's existing community court structure.225 Over the previous
decade, the San Francisco District Attorney's office had created a
system of 12 volunteer-based "community courts," which heard
quality-of-life violation cases and other nuisance crimes. 226  Some
219. See Robert Selna, Judges OK Mayor's Plan for New Court, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 2007,
at B12. This endorsement was never truly in question as the Presiding Judge of the Superior
Court along with other judges had visited the Midtown Community Court and RHCJC in October
of 2006 and supported the creation of such a program in San Francisco. See TENDERLOIN NEEDS
ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 7.
220. See Knight, supra note 115, at Al.
221. Because the city of San Francisco is a consolidated city-county, the Board of
Supervisors acts as a city counsel and the Mayor as a county executive.
222. See Selna, supra note 219, at B12.
223. See Knight, supra note 201, at AI.
224. See Knight, supra note 115, at AI.
225. See id.
226. See http://www.sfdistrictattorney.org/ (follow "Neighborhood Safety" hyperlink; then
follow "Community Court Program" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). Unlike the formal
community courts discussed above, this system operates more as a diversion board, wherein
offenders can present their case to a panel of local citizens. If the offender accepts and completes
the punishment the panel gives (usually a fine or community service), the District Attorney agrees
to drop the charges. One central concern about this system is that it is staffed by volunteers who
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members of these panels saw the new CJC as a threat: "It sounds like
the mayor is trying to move in on community courts and maybe even
kill them." '227 Especially given the declining use of the existing
community court panels over the past few years, 22 8 many members
feared that the new CJC would spell the end of this type of
community involvement. Through continued interaction, however,
many of the members of these panels have been brought more
directly into the planning process for the CJC.229 One of the CJC's
coordinators sees the physical site of the center as a key community
meeting space and a possible permanent location for the community
court panels to meet and continue to hear cases.
230
Ultimately, the CJC aims to have a permanent Advisory
Committee, made up of city officials, law enforcement personnel and
four to six members from the local community,231 ideally including
representatives of business, housing, and workforce development
groups, and more.232  The CJC planners aspire to have the
Committee meet twice a month to discuss the direction of the CJC
and hear community concerns.233 They also hope to hold monthly,
public town meetings to permit broader members of the public to
share their thoughts and concerns.234 In all, the goals behind the
planning process have been to both increase the transparency of the
have the time to attend these "hearings" during the day. This obviously limits the population of
individuals who can serve on the panels and would seem to put the poor and homeless at an even
greater risk of injustice as the people with leisure time in the heart of the day are less likely to
empathize with those who cannot even afford a roof to sleep under. See Kurki, supra note 94, at
288-90.
227. See Knight, supra note 115, at Al. The local newspaper also weighed in on the side of
the existing community courts, see Editorial, Courting the Community; "Quality of Life" Must Be
a Priority. S.F. CHRON., MAY 13, 2007, at E4.
228. See Knight, supra note 115, at Al.
229. See Interview with Elaine Zamora, supra note 211.
230. See Interview with Lisa Lightman, Director, Collaborative Justice Courts (Mar. 6, 2008).
The community court panels currently meet in various locations, including churches, hotels and
other community centers. See id.
231. See CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO & SAN FRANCISCO SUPERIOR COURT
COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER, Application for Appointment to: Community Justice Center for
Advisory Board (2008) [hereinafter APPLICATION] at 1, available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/
uploadedfiles/courts/divisions/CollaborativeJustice/ CJC_Application.pdf.
232. See Lisa Lightman, Director of Collaborative Justice Courts Comments on New CJC
Program, MOVING JUSTICE FORWARD, http://www.sfcollaborativejustice.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008).
233. See Interview with Lisa Lightman, supra note 230.
234. See Lightman, supra note 232.
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CJC's development and create a working structure that can address
the day-to-day concerns of the community.
B. Current Structure
The CJC opened its doors for the first time in January of this
year. 235 While much of the day-to-day processes of the CJC are still
in the planning stages, the general structure has slowly been
established.236 Modeled after both the RHCJC and the Midtown
Community Court, the CJC will serve a specific geographic area and
will offer a variety of social services for the local community.
237
However, its ability to address quality-of-life offenses and other
neighborhood nuisances is hindered by legal and political obstacles.
The CJC will have jurisdiction over an 80-block area of central
San Francisco, encompassing almost all of San Francisco's
Supervisorial District 6, along with parts of Districts 2 and 3 (the
catchment area).238 This geographical region is responsible for
much of the city's crime and home to much of its poverty. The
Center for Court Innovation assessment found that 23 percent of the
District's residents live below the federal poverty and unemployment
sits at around 10 percent. 23 9 On top of that, the same region has the
lowest rate of home ownership in the city,240 and claims 45 percent
of the city's homeless population.24' Unsurprisingly, this same
region is responsible for a third of the city's drug offences 242 and it is
estimated that one-quarter to one-third of all crime in the city occurs
within this catchment area. 243  While it does not yet have a
permanent location, the CJC sat for the first time in the San
235. See Heather Knight, Mayor's Quality-of-Life Crimes Court has Shaky Start, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 5, 2008, at B 1.
236. See Interview with Lisa Lightman, supra note 230.
237. See Lightman, supra note 232.
238. See TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 9.
239. See TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 11. Because the Center will
have jurisdiction over a geographical region which does not fit into a pre-existing political
subdivision (e.g., police precinct, zip-code, Supervisorial District), the statistics are somewhat
splintered. For example, the unemployment rate for the Tenderloin is 8.11 percent, but it is 10.42
percent in the South of Market Neighborhood. See id.
240. Around 10 percent of District 6 residents own their own homes. See id.
241. See id. at 12.
242. In 2005, the Tenderloin accounted for 34 percent of San Francisco's 5,441 narcotics
arrests. See id. at 13.
243. See id. at 4. This estimate does not include automobile break-ins.
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Francisco Hall of Justice 244 and will likely move to a location closer
to the heart of the Tenderloin neighborhood, adjacent to the Superior
24Court House. 24 Such a move will enable officers to bring offenders
in to the CJC faster and will locate social services in an area more
accessible to community members, offenders, and employees.
The CJC plans to operate as a coordinating hub for many of the
city's social services programs, if perhaps on a smaller scale than the
RHCJC.2 4 6 The catchment area is already home to some 200 social
and health service providers and homeless shelters.247  Community
members feel that the lack of consistent coordination among these
agencies creates the paradox of a wealth of services and the
persistent disorder in the neighborhood. 248 By providing a hub for
community services and centralizing various city-wide agencies,
coordinators of the CJC hope to limit the overlap between providers
and streamline the process of getting individuals the care they
need.249  Moreover, the CJC will provide services available to all
members of the local community, regardless of whether or not they
have been charged with a crime.
The CJC will have jurisdiction over most crimes occurring in the
catchment area, principally misdemeanors and non-violent
251felonies. Unlike the RHCJC, the CJC will not operate on a multi-
jurisdictional level, avoiding family law (domestic violence) and
sex-worker cases.252 The drug cases that come before the court will
likely be forwarded on to the already established drug courts, which
have superior experience in adjudicating - and treating - drug
crimes.253  The specific functioning of the court and the manner in
which it will deal with future cases is still an on going process.
254
As with both the RHCJC and the Midtown Community Court, the
244. 850 Bryant St., on the eastern edge of the catchment area, in the SOMA neighborhood.
See Knight, supra note 235, at B1.
245. See Interview with Lisa Lightman, supra note 230.
246. See id.
247. See TENDERLOIN NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 12.
248. See Interview with Elaine Zamora, supra note 211.
249. See Interview with Lisa Lightman, supra note 230.
250. See id.; Lightman, supra note 232.
251. See Lightman, supra note 232.
252. See Interview with Lisa Lightman, supra note 230.
253. See id. For information on the San Francisco Drug Courts, see
http://www.sfgov.org/site/courts-page.asp?id -68752 (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
254. See Interview with Lisa Lightman, supra note 230.
Winter 20091
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
CJC will operate with one sitting judge, who will oversee the
hearings and sentencing of all the offenders.255
Perhaps the most important distinction between the CJC and the
New York courts is the fact that it will not directly deal with
standard quality-of-life violations. Under California law, any person
arrested for "an offense declared to be a misdemeanor, including a
violation of any city or county ordinance... shall, instead of being
taken before a magistrate, be released[.],, 256 Essentially, with few
exceptions,257 this means that individuals cited for standard quality-
of-life offenses are given a ticket and told to be in Traffic Court in 45
days.258 Thus, state law limits the ability of the CJC to deal with
many of the very crimes that brought about its creation. Rather than
being the centerpiece in a city-wide clean up of crime-ridden
neighborhoods, the CJC will likely be hamstrung by its inability to
rapidly adjudicate quality-of-life offenses. Still, supporters of the
project believe that the CJC's focus on more serious crimes and
offenses will address area residents' top concerns.259
Central to the functioning of the new court is streamlining the
"point of contact to point of service" - decreasing the time between
the police citing an offender and the offender beginning a restorative
sentence in the community. 260 This goal requires close coordination
between the local police and the CJC's staff. While the current time
between citation and appearance can be anywhere up to 45 days, the
CJC aims to limit this window to no more than five days. 261 By
shrinking this window, the CJC hopes to get more individuals into
treatment plans and out of the cycle of behavior that got them
arrested in the first place. 262 Ideally, an offender would arrive at the
CJC, meet with a defense lawyer, have the case reviewed by a
prosecuting attorney, appear before a judge and make a treatment
255. See Lightman, supra note 232.
256. CAL. PEN. CODE § 853.6 (a)
257. An officer may take an individual into custody after citing them under a few specific
circumstances, including: extreme intoxication, outstanding warrant, the offender demanding to
appear before a magistrate, the officer having reason to believe the offender will not appear at the
court. See id. § 853.6 (i). Depending on how courts interpret the statutory language, this last
exception could provide sufficient latitude for police to bring in minor quality-of-life offenders.
258. See Heather Knight, Community Court Plan Advances, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2007, at
DI.
259. See id.
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263plan, all in one day. The goal is to provide immediate justice for
the community and immediate services for the offender.264
C. The Challenges Ahead
There are two types of challenges that lie ahead for this fledgling
criminal justice program. The first revolves around the local politics
in San Francisco and the future funding and success of the program.
Such success is linked to how well the new CJC can address the
critiques, laid out above, leveled against community courts as an
265institution. This is the second type of challenge.
Beyond the street protests that occurred shortly after the Mayor
announced his plan to start a community justice center in the
Tenderloin, the firm opposition various members of the county
Board of Supervisors could prove to be a significant roadblock.2 6
The supervisors have made funding the CJC contingent on the
creation of a firm plan 267 and have played political ping pong with
the CJC since its inception. 268 While some of this funding has come
through,269 the program must rapidly prove its efficacy to overcome
the Supervisors' initial skepticism.
The other central monetary problem facing the CJC is its reliance
on New York City models while virtually ignoring the existing
programs it has in place. While both the Midtown Community Court
and the RHCJC have much larger geographical jurisdiction than the
CJC, New York's police force and budgetary flexibility are also
much larger.27° Moreover, the city already funds the existing
community court panels at half the approved budget for the CJC
2 71
and such perceived double funding may not go over well with voters.
263. See Pat Murphy, San Francisco Moves to Swifter Justice for Quality of Life Victims, S.F.




266. See Knight, supra note 115, at Al.
267. See Heather Knight, Newsom's "Community Court" is Dealt a Setback; Committee
Holds Up Cash Over Lack of Formal Plan, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 2007, at B2.
268. See Wyatt Buchanan, Supes OK $500,000 for New Crime Court, Delay Vote on Street
Closures, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 2008, at BI.
269. See id.
270. See Karen Crommie, Letter to the Editor, Quality of Life in San Francisco, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 24, 2007, at B4.
271. See Heather Knight, Quality-of-Life Courtship, S.F. CHRON., July 22, 2007, at B1.
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The two programs are actually very different in scope and practice,
but without more unity within the ranks or clarity within the media,
such a division will likely hurt the CJC's future legitimacy and
budget.
Potentially, the money problems will solve themselves. If the
CJC is successful in coordinating the various service agencies and
can get offenders into functional treatment plans (see below), the
city's savings could easily make up for the costs of the CJC itself.
Adequate coordination, assuming the treatment programs are
successful at decreasing recidivism, could cut out redundancy and
could lead to more streamlined and efficient provision of services to
those in need. Providing more services, proactively, is also likely to
cut back on the tremendous price the city (and an individual) pays
when drug abuse or mental illness lead to the hospital or require
other emergency responses.
The growing pains the CJC faces may also cause problems. The
quality of life in the Tenderloin and SOMA keeps many residents in
a constant state of discomfort and sweeping new proposals will need
to provide visible results in the short term. Community members are
already demanding more clarity and written promises from the
planners. 272 Perhaps more important is gaining buy-in from police
and offenders. At its first meeting in early 2008, as an array of city
officials waited, only one of the three scheduled defendants appeared
before the court. 2 7 3 As a member of the city's Public Defender's
office said, "The only thing worse than an ineffective government
policy is paying twenty government employees to stand around and
watch how ineffective it is." 274  The CJC will need to get better
compliance in order to raise its legitimacy as a viable alternative to,
and improvement upon, the current criminal justice system.
Alongside these local problems, the CJC also faces the same
criticisms as other community courts, namely, the dangers of
weakening traditional court structures, the nature of the community
served (and not served) by the courts, and the failure to reach the
problems for which the court was created. It is likely too early to
assess many of these critiques in great detail, but by examining how
272. See Interview with Elaine Zamora, supra note 211.
273. See Knight, supra note 235, at BI.
274. See id.
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the CJC measures up against each of these potential problems, its
likelihood of success and potential next steps may become clearer.
i. Departure from Court Norms
Much like other community courts, the nature of the judicial
process at the CJC will likely place the city's public defenders in a
bind. As one main goal of the CJC is to speed up the time between
"contact" and "service," the ability of defense lawyers to adequately
counsel their clients will be hindered. Moreover, the conflict
between aggressive advocacy and doing what may be best for the
client will arise in this context, as it has in other courts. To combat
this concern, the San Francisco Public Defender, Jeff Adachi, laid
out his goals for defending individuals within the new Community
Justice Center system. 275  He hopes to ensure that the initial
counseling between the public defender and the accused individual is
not pro forma, but involves an actual examination of whether or not
276the elements of the alleged crime can be proven. Moreover, the
system will still give offenders the right to a jury trial, and a right to
a showing of probable cause. If these stated safeguards play out in
the day-to-day application of justice in the new CJC, there is hope
that it will overcome one of the central problems facing other
community courts.
The other major concern with regard to a move away from
traditional courts is the weakening of the rule of law. Already this is
evident in the gradual formation of the new CJC. The simple fact
that the project's coordinators are not clear on exactly which charges
will be adjudicated in the CJC's court leaves a tremendous amount
of discretion in the hands of the presiding judge and court
administrators. This type of flexibility may be standard in the
formation of a community court and thus may ultimately be only a
short-term concern, but in the meantime offenders may find
themselves as guinea pigs, being used to determine the extent of the
power this new court has. In viewing the history and success of
other community courts, though this flaw may persist, it is not
necessarily fatal to the enterprise. In sum, the CJC is likely to run up
against some challenges as a non-traditional court, but through firm
275. See Murphy, supra note 263.
276. See id.
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procedural safeguards and consistent application of precedent, it may
well provide a model for future projects.
ii. Nature of the Community Served
A central concern for poverty and defense advocates is that the
community that holds the most sway over community courts is often
distinct from the population that such courts routinely process. 277 In
the case of San Francisco's Community Justice Center, a broad
sweep of the community has had the opportunity to play a role in the
planning and development of the new court structure. While
economic interests have been a large supporter, the financial backing
for the project currently comes from city funds, not local businesses.
Some concern logically exists around who is taking an active role
in the Advisory Committee and what voices will be heard in those
meetings. Given the challenges facing many low-income citizens,
having the free time to commit to the Committee or the
qualifications to be selected as a member, may discount a large
portion of the most impacted population. That said, at many of the
meetings - those held by the Center for Court Innovation and those
sponsored by the CJC's planners - the attending crowd represented
278
a wide range of community stakeholders and area organizations.
Additionally, the CJC plans to hold regular community town
meetings. These will enable many neighborhood residents to have
their concerns heard in a public setting. As with the RHCJC,
however, how the CJC reacts to such feedback remains to be seen. It
has yet to implement a policy for providing real community control;
simply providing a forum to be heard does not equate with providing
a true voice in policy decisions.
iii. Failure to Reach the Intended Goals
Any assessment of the success of the CJC or its future potential
as an agent for positive change in the neighborhood must examine
how the CJC measures up to the goals upon which it was founded. It
is far too early for any legitimate assessment of the impact the CJC
277. See supra notes 194 - 200.
278. See Interview with Elaine Zamora, supra note 211; Interview with Lisa Lightman, supra
note 230.
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has had on the day-to-day quality of life for residents in the
Tenderloin. Still, if, as with most community courts, a central
rationale behind the founding of the CJC was to deal with rampant
quality-of-life violations in the catchment area, the plan has two
gaping flaws.
First the California Penal Code, section 853.6, severely limits the
CJC's ability to deal with exactly the type of violations it set out to
address. Because San Francisco police have limited authority to
bring minor offenders in to the CJC within a few days of citing them,
the efficacy of the system is put in jeopardy. Part of the success of
both RHCJC and Midtown Community Court is that offenders are
given a rapid and direct path to treatment, following their offense.
But under California law, anyone cited for violating one of the city's
quality-of-life ordinances would be given a summons to appear in
traffic court within 45 days. This hardly addresses the needs of
either the community or the offender. More importantly, it is
precisely these offenses, if one subscribes to the "broken windows"
theory of community development, that are at the heart of improving
life on the streets in the Tenderloin. If the CJC cannot deal with the
very disorder that makes the neighborhood feel unsafe, it is hard to
imagine how it will gain legitimacy in the eyes of the local
population. It is precisely this goal of increased legitimacy and order
that led to the creation of the first community courts. Missing the
mark here could jeopardize the San Francisco experiment.
The second challenge is that the services the CJC offers are only
available to local residents of the catchment area. 279 This means that
offenders from outside those 80 square-blocks are shipped off to
their own local courts. This does little to help the problems facing
the Tenderloin and its residents. While the CJC cannot speedily
adjudicate most quality-of-life violations, the only cases it can hear
must involve local offenders. At first glance this seems to be a
logical system, doling out the local resources to local residents and
ensuring that local offenders perform any restoration work. The
problem arises when offenders are arrested and claim not to live in
the neighborhood - perhaps because they are homeless, or
legitimately do not live in the neighborhood or wish to sidestep the
CJC's system. Depending on the violation in question, this means
279. See Interview with Elaine Zamora, supra note 211.
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they will simply be told to comply with the ruling of their local court
(almost inevitably a traditional criminal justice court) and thus the
impacted community will not necessarily be restored and the flaws
of the criminal justice system, which gave rise to the creation and
implementation of community courts, will continue unabated.
Because the CJC cannot rapidly adjudicate low-level quality-of-
life offenses and will not hear cases involving non-resident
offenders, the system lacks the coercive power to force many of the
offending individuals into the treatment programs that lie at the heart
of the community court model. Without being able to compel
community service to restore the neighborhoods or get drug addicts
the treatment they need, the CJC may end up missing out on many of
the crimes and criminals that riddle the Tenderloin and SOMA.
These gaps in the program may ultimately be closed though passing
additional laws and broadening the CJC's catchment area, but
without doing so, much of the planning, funding and intent behind of
the court may be for not. If the CJC cannot show results on the
street, no matter how efficient it becomes at providing and
coordinating social and health services, the future of community
support and public funding may well be in danger.
One final concern that the implementation of the CJC raises is
the potential displacement of the homeless population. In other
cities, community courts increase the capacity for the criminal justice
system to deal with quality-of-life violations. That means that police
are more likely to enforce such ordinances and this, in turn, leads to
the further criminalization of poverty and homelessness. This
increase in police activity and harassment of the homeless will force
those individuals to seek other areas to inhabit, areas where police
enforce quality-of-life statutes less rigorously. Rather than helping
them get treatment, broader criminal enforcement within the
catchment area may lead potential and past offenders to move into
other neighborhoods, outside the catchment area. Again, this does
little to solve the underlying problem of poverty and lack of
affordable housing and instead pushes individuals out of their own
routines and into other neighborhoods which invariably have fewer
social services and are likely less capable of dealing with them.
While the above critiques highlight some potential challenges
that the CJC may face in the coming years, they should not be taken
as an overall condemnation of the project. In many ways, the
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intentional design process of the CJC has allowed for the
involvement of many community voices and this can only make the
project stronger. Additionally, the on going community meetings
will permit future dialogue between community members focused on
cleaning up the neighborhood and advocates for the poor.
Nonetheless, the CJC will have to develop strategies for effectively
dealing with low-level offenses, non-resident offenders and possible
displacement if it hopes to gain true legitimacy in the community.
Without initiative and creativity, the CJC will only continue to
further criminalize poverty and provide hollow hope to the residents
of these communities.
IV. Conclusion
The process of reclaiming neighborhoods from criminal elements
is not straightforward. While cities have attempted many different
approaches, the focus on criminalizing quality-of-life offenses and
zero-tolerance policing has taken hold in many regions of the
country. Such tactics have severe consequences for both the
communities in question and the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system as a whole. Out of this discord came the idea of community
courts: justice systems where neighbors could take an active role in
determining how punishments were meted out and how communities
and offenders could be restored. As this type of adjudication has
caught hold, many different models of community courts have
developed across the country, each with its own unique tools and its
own shortcomings.
In dealing with the problems facing the Tenderloin and SOMA
neighborhoods, the San Francisco Community Justice Center is
clearly a step in the right direction. It is a move away from ignoring
troubled neighborhoods or attempting to clean them up with out-
right criminal punishment for the poor, and towards providing need
services in an effort to serve a population in need. The CJC provides
a model that can both be responsive to the local community and
innovative in its reaction to the underlying causes of crime. At a
minimum, it will serve to coordinate vital services and connect a
small number of offenders with needed treatment. As it continues to
grow, it has the opportunity to keep the city and local court system
focused on serving a segment of the population that is too often
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ignored. By joining criminal punishment with restorative service
and treatment plans, the CJC may also bring more funding to social
programs through the guise of law-and-order budget items.
Ultimately, it is too early to judge the future success of the project,
but without reacting to some of the flaws already present in the
system and creatively solving weaknesses inherent in community
courts, the hope of a peaceful walk from the subway to City Hall
may continue to be a distant dream.
